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A number of important contributions to the political economy literature have argued that 
changes in the financial sector have been amongst the main reflections, or even the driving 
forces, of recent transformations of capitalism in the rich countries. This hypothesis has been 
referred to as ‘financialisation’. We argue in this article that the interdisciplinary literature 
could be enriched if the macroeconomic dimension of financialisation was more explicitly 
taken into account. In particular, important macroeconomic constraints regarding the determi-
nation of profits, in the face of a decreasing importance of physical investment and an in-
creased importance of financial operations, are often not explicitly considered. We compare 
our macroeconomic approach with contributions from different strands in the existing litera-
ture, including empirical analyses of new patterns of profit generation, the ‘varieties of capi-
talism’ approach, the British ‘social accounting’ literature, and the French ‘regulationist’ lit-
erature. Our theoretical framework is illustrated by means of an empirical comparison of the 
effects of financialisation in the USA and in Germany. 
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1.  Introduction 
A number of important contributions to the political economy literature have argued that 
changes in the financial sector have been amongst the main reflections, or even the driving 
forces, of recent transformations of capitalism in the rich countries. This hypothesis is often 
referred to as ‘financialisation’, although not all contributions use this term explicitly. We 
argue in this article that the emerging interdisciplinary research programme on financialisa-
tion
1 could be enriched if the macroeconomic dimension of financialisation, particularly in 
terms of the generation of profits, was more explicitly taken into account. We therefore com-
pare our macroeconomic approach with important strands in the existing literature, including 
empirical analyses of new patterns of profit generation, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach, 
the British ‘social accounting’ literature, and the French ‘regulationist’ literature.  
A remarkable macroeconomic phenomenon that has been recognised by various political 
economists is that profit rates have developed very favourably in many advanced economies 
over the past 20 or 30 years, while physical investment dynamics have tended to slow down 
(e.g. Krippner, 2005: 174; Duménil and Lévy, 2003, 2005; Höpner, 2003: 306, 2005: 346; 
Stockhammer, 2007; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: xxxvii). One popular explanation of this 
macroeconomic phenomenon is that increased shareholder value orientation, as an important 
constituent of financialisation, has induced firms to develop a larger preference for profitabil-
ity at the expense of investment (and potentially jobs and growth). Indeed, such a conclusion 
appears logical from the point of view of a firm-centred political economy where firms are 
seen as ‘the key agents of adjustment ... whose activities aggregate into overall levels of eco-
nomic performance’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001b: 6). Similarly, the observation that financial 
profits have increased relative to non-financial profits has led many authors to conclude that 
there has been some sort of ‘decoupling’ of the financial sphere of the economy from the real 
sphere in the sense that, with financialisation, ‘profits accrue primarily through financial 
channels rather than through trade and commodity production’ (Krippner, 2005: 174). Appar-
ently, many firms have decided to abandon the real sector and ‘moved into financial opera-
tions to increase profits’ (Epstein, 2005: 7; see also Krippner, 2005; Crotty, 2005; Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005: 367).  
In this article, we attempt to clarify some of the hypotheses sketched above from a macro-
economic perspective. In particular, we recall that macroeconomic profits must always be 
based on real income flows and that there is a positive, not a negative, relationship between 
                                                 
1 An International Working Group on Financialization (IWGF) has recently been set up ‘to establish … dialogue 
between researchers in different disciplines … who … had shared interests in financialization and could learn 
from each other.’ (http://www.iwgf.org). 2 
profits and physical investment at the macroeconomic level. Hence, when firms in the aggre-
gate reduce investment (the accumulation rate), perhaps as a result of shareholder value orien-
tation, an increase in profits (the profit rate) is only possible if some other component of ag-
gregate demand more than compensates for the decrease in investment (the accumulation 
rate). More precisely, macroeconomic profits are by definition equal to the sum of investment 
spending, consumption expenditure out of profits, the government deficit and the external 
surplus, less saving out of wage income (Kalecki, 1942; Cordonnier, 2006). 
More generally, we also try to show how a systematic integration of (Post Keynesian) 
macroeconomic theory may fruitfully complement particular strands in the political economy 
literature on financialisation. For instance, we agree on the usefulness of the concept of ‘com-
plementarity’, which is central to the varieties of capitalism approach.
2 In this literature, how-
ever, complementarity is understood mainly in terms of financial market and labour market 
institutions affecting individual firm behaviour. In our view, in order to obtain a coherent ex-
planation of macroeconomic phenomena, it would be helpful to apply the complementarity 
concept (more systematically) to all social norms, cultural and ideological aspects and politi-
cal power relations which affect private investment decisions, personal consumption behav-
iour, government policies, and international economic relations.  
Our approach is in several respects similar to the structural analyses of financialisation in 
the British social accounting and the French regulationist literatures.
3 For instance, Froud et 
al. (2002: 140, 1) also remark a tendency among political economists to infer overall eco-
nomic outcomes from the analysis of firm behaviour alone: ‘Political economists who under-
stand that the behaviour of corporate managers matters, may still need to be persuaded about 
how the behaviour of individuals in households is equally important. .... This is an important 
institution, neglected since the decline of Keynesian macro economics and now mainly dis-
cussed by communitarians and the radical right.’ Nevertheless, the social accounting literature 
on financialisation seems to lack a coherent formulation of macroeconomic circuit relations, 
as becomes apparent e.g. in the otherwise seminal analysis of ‘coupon pool capitalism’ by 
Froud et al. (2002). On the other hand, regulationist models of ‘finance-led’ or ‘wealth-based’ 
growth appear to neglect potential macroeconomic instabilities linked to financialisation, that 
have, however, been highlighted in the Post Keynesian literature. 
                                                 
2 The varieties of capitalism approach builds in particular on the seminal book edited by Hall and Soskice 
(2001a). For an overview, see Hall and Soskice (2001b). An important empirical analysis of institutional com-
plementarity is Hall and Gingerich (2004). For a theoretical assessment of the complementarity concept, see 
Höpner (2005), Amable et al. (2005), Crouch et al. (2005).  
3 On the social accounting literature on financialisation, see Erturk et al. (2004, 2005, 2007), and Froud et al. 
(2000, 2002, 2007). On the regulationist literature on financialisation, see in particular Boyer (2000) and Aglietta 
(2000), Aglietta and Breton (2001), Aglietta (1999). 3 
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review ‘firm-centred’ political 
economy approaches to financialisation. These are grouped into two distinct strands: the first 
consists of primarily empirical analyses of structural change mainly in the US economy with a 
particular interest in the process of profit generation by firms in different sectors of the econ-
omy.
4 The second includes contributions heading under the labels varieties of capitalism and 
institutional complementarity. In the third section, we first briefly discuss formally why the 
process of profit generation and individual firm performance cannot be accurately understood 
without the notion of important macroeconomic constraints. Against this background, we then 
review existing structuralist accounts of financialisation, in particular the concept of ‘coupon 
pool capitalism’ developed by British social accountants, and the regulationist approach. We 
also briefly compare these literatures with existing macroeconomic models of financialisation. 
Our review of the literature is necessarily selective and incomplete, but we hope to grasp the 
essential conclusions from the respective approaches. In the fourth section, we develop our 
own macroeconomic perspective. Our theoretical considerations are illustrated empirically by 
means of a comparison of the political economy of financialisation in the USA and in Ger-
many. This allows us to show that the ‘decoupling’ of profits and physical investment, ob-
servable in both countries, is compatible with very different social and macroeconomic envi-
ronments, centred around a wealth- and debt-based consumption boom in the US on the one 
hand, and an increasing orientation towards foreign goods and financial markets in Germany 
on the other. We conclude that, despite an apparent ‘convergence’ to the Anglo-Saxon model 
in terms of financial and labour market institutions and corporate strategies, the macroeco-
nomic effects of financialisation in Germany have been, and will arguably continue to be, 
very different from the US experience. We also assess the usefulness of the concept of ‘cou-
pon pool capitalism’ for the US and German economies and discuss the macroeconomic in-
stabilities involved with financialisation in both countries. In the concluding section, we 
summarise our results and identify potentially promising directions of future interdisciplinary 
research on financialisation.  
 
2.  Firm-centred analyses of financialisation in the political economy literature 
2.1   Profit generation, real and financial investment and structural change 
There is a range of recent and innovative work exploring how financialisation is linked to new 
patterns of production and profit generation. We refer here mainly to a number of widely 
                                                 
4 One widely quoted contribution to this literature is Krippner (2005), who, in turn, draws on earlier work by e.g. 
Arrighi (1994), Magdoff and Sweezy (1987), Fligstein (2001). Further contributions with a similar focus can be 
found in the collected volume on financialisation by Epstein (2005), e.g. Epstein and Jayadev (2005), Duménil 
and Lévy (2005), and Crotty (2005).  4 
quoted contributions by US economists and sociologists
5, which have the primarily descrip-
tive, and very important, objective to establish stylised facts supporting the hypothesis of fi-
nancialisation in the US. However, many of these analyses are, at least implicitly, grounded in 
a firm-centred view of financialisation, potentially hiding the underlying macroeconomic 
mechanisms.  
As mentioned in the introduction, one phenomenon that is usually ascribed to financialisa-
tion is that physical accumulation has generally been declining since the early 1980s, while at 
the same time corporate profit rates have developed very positively. Clearly, from the point of 
view of one firm, there may be a trade-off between profits and investment: (short-term) de-
mand can be seen as exogenously given, so that reducing the costs of investment mechani-
cally increases profits, given by the difference of receipts and costs. Besides, very fast expan-
sion may be linked to inefficiencies in the production process (Penrose, 1959). Conversely, 
from the point of view of the aggregate business sector, investment expenditure constitutes 
not only costs, but also an important part of total demand so that, ceteris paribus, profits are 
positively related to investment.  
Therefore, it is unclear, for example, what Krippner (2005: 174), in a frequently quoted 
article, means when she defines ‘financialisation as a pattern of accumulation in which profits 
accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity produc-
tion (see Arrighi, 1994).’ Here, Krippner (2005: 182) follows ‘a number of researchers (who) 
suggest that the origins of the current turn to finance can be found in the crisis of profitability 
that beset US firms in the 1970s. … nonfinancial firms responded to falling returns on in-
vestment by withdrawing capital from production and diverting it to financial markets.’ 
 According to Crotty (2005: 104) (for similar conclusions, see Epstein, 2005: 7 and Ep-
stein and Jayadev, 2005: 64),  
(m)any NFCs (non-financial corporations) responded … to the high returns they ob-
served being made on financial assets and financial enterprises, in two innovative 
ways. First, an increasing per cent of NFC investment funds were used to acquire fi-
nancial assets. Second, firms created or bought financial subsidiaries, and expanded 
those financial subsidiaries already in existence. These widely noted developments 
are sometimes referred to as the ‘financialization’ of the NFC in the neoliberal era. 
It is undoubtedly true that many profits are nowadays linked to financial activities. Yet, 
given the macroeconomic definition of profits provided in the introduction and to be devel-
oped more rigorously in section 3.1 below, aggregate profits ultimately rely on the production 
                                                 
5 See the previous footnote. In his introduction, Epstein (2005: 3) refers to Krippner’s (2004) ‘excellent discus-
sion of the history of the term (financialisation) and the pros and cons of various definitions’ and to Krippner’s 
own definition of financialisation, which we take as largely representative of this strand of the literature (see 
below).  5 
and trade of real goods and services and firms in the aggregate can by no means autono-
mously choose either between real investment (production) and profits at large or even be-
tween non-financial and financial profits. Thus, it is in our view at least semantically, if not 
conceptually, problematic to consider ‘the financial sector as a source of profits for the econ-
omy’ (Krippner, 2005: 182).  
 
2.2   Varieties of capitalism, institutional complementarity and financialisation 
The varieties of capitalism approach is ‘a firm-centered political economy that regards com-
panies as the crucial actors in a capitalist economy’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001b: 6). Hence, it is 
argued, the main differences between developed economies are accounted for by the organisa-
tion of firms. Within the firm, particular attention is paid to financial and labour relations: 
‘Corporate governance and labour relations (are) the two most important spheres of the econ-
omy.’ (Hall and Gingerich, 2004: 17) Moreover, it is argued that there is institutional com-
plementarity between the two areas so that there are different internally coherent and efficient 
variants of capitalism. For example, when financial markets are ‘fluid’, labour markets typi-
cally are (and should be) deregulated as well. When labour markets are highly coordinated, 
financial markets typically are (and should be) highly regulated as well. Accordingly, ‘liberal 
market economies’ (LMEs) can be distinguished from ‘coordinated market economies’ 
(CMEs) (Hall and Soskice, 2001b; Aoki, 1994):  
The logic is that firms that do not have to sustain current profitability in the face of a 
fluctuating economy are better placed to make credible commitments to their em-
ployees about wages and job security and therefore better able to realize the gains 
available from utilizing production regimes based on such commitments. This combi-
nation of institutions corresponds to the institutional patterns the varieties of capital-
ism perspective sees in CMEs. Conversely, where firms are more dependent on dis-
persed equity markets, face the prospect of hostile takeovers, and confront regulations 
that give shareholders more power relative to stakeholders, the autonomy of the firm 
and its managers will be more dependent on current profitability. Here, labor markets 
allowing for high levels of labor turnover and competitive wage-setting will be more 
efficient, because they enable managers to reduce wages or staffing levels more 
quickly in response to fluctuations in current profitability, and allow the kind of labor 
relations that permit firms to exploit the high levels of capital mobility available in 
such economies. This combination of institutional practices corresponds to the case of 
a classic LME. (Hall and Gingerich, 2004: 23) 
Although the notion of financialisation has not been the primary concern in the varieties 
of capitalism literature, financialisation clearly seems more compatible with the LME model 
rather than with the CME model. This also follows from the analysis by Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000) who have anticipated the link between investment behaviour and institu-
tional complementarity, by contrasting the corporate policy ‘retain and invest’ (in non-6 
financialised economies) with the strategy ‘downsize and distribute’ (as a result of increased 
shareholder value orientation and higher profitability pressures). These different policies con-
cern both ‘the money (firms) earn and the people whom they employ’, i.e. financial and la-
bour markets (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000: 14). At least implicitly, it is often held that this 
trade-off between investment (accumulation) and profits (the profit rate) at the firm level also 
feeds through to the aggregate level (see, e.g, Amable et al., 2005; Höpner, 2003: 306, 2005: 
346; Höpner and Jackson, 2001: 12). As noted by Höpner (2005: 348) in his survey of the 
institutional complementarity literature, ‘shareholder-oriented restructuring promotes profit-
ability by slowing down growth’ (in terms of the expansion of firms). 
The varieties of capitalism approach has produced many valuable insights, which, as we 
shall argue below, can be readily included into a macroeconomic analysis of financialisation. 
However, it is our contention that whether particular labour and financial market institutions 
lead to higher or lower macroeconomic accumulation or profitability cannot be answered 
without an assessment of overall macroeconomic conditions. These are in turn linked to social 
norms and political power relations, concerning in particular income distribution, personal 
consumption behaviour, macroeconomic policies and foreign economic relations.  
Of course, given space limitations, we cannot do justice to the full complexity of the va-
rieties of capitalism literature here. To be fair, it should be noted that different attempts have 
been made to extend the notion of complementarity to a broader set of social specificities and 
institutions. As an example, and as reviewed by Höpner (2005: 339, 40), some authors argue 
that particular welfare state arrangements are also linked to different corporate governance 
systems. For instance, individualistic old age pension schemes are complementary to devel-
oped equity markets with influential institutional investors who in turn shape corporate strate-
gies. On the other hand, solidaristic retirement systems are more likely to exist in countries 
with lower degrees of income inequality, where more individuals have a preference for less 
risky assets (see also Vitols, 2001; Jackson, 2001, 2004; Jackson and Vitols, 2001). However, 
such a view of complementarity remains somewhat ‘mechanic’ and does not take social 
norms into account that may persist in particular countries even as labour and financial market 
institutions and income distribution change and that affect the process of profit generation. 
In section 4, we will develop these arguments with respect to financialisation in the USA 
and in Germany, which are (or used to be) seen as good examples of an LME and a CME re-
spectively in the varieties of capitalism and institutional complementarity literature (e.g. Hall 
and Gingerich, 2004; Höpner, 2005). We will conclude that, even if there was (further) insti-
tutional convergence in Germany towards the US model, and even if Germany completely 
shifted to the LME model in terms of corporate governance and labour relations, the macro-7 
economic outcome of financialisation would still be likely to be very different from the US 
experience. 
 
3.  Structuralist views of financialisation in the political economy literature 
3.1   A reminder on some important macroeconomic relations 
In this subsection, we aim to analyse the macroeconomic process of profit determination with 
more rigour. First, we define gross national income (GNI) at current market prices as 
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where CW and CΠ respectively denote consumption out of wages and capital income, I
g is 
gross private investment, G is government expenditure, X and M are respectively exports and 
imports, and FIA-H – FIH-A is net factor income received from abroad.  
Gross national income is distributed between wages and profits net of direct taxes, W
n and 
Π
n, capital allowances (depreciation), D, and the government’s receipts from direct and indi-
rect taxes, TW, TΠ, and Tind, less subsidies, Z: 
 




MP − + + + Π + + = Π
 
From identities (1) and (2) we obtain the following macroeconomic profit equation: 
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Net profits are the sum of consumption out of profits, net private investment (I
n = I
g – D), 
the government deficit (G
D = G – TW – TΠ – Tind + Z) and the external balance (EXT = X – M 
+ FIA-H – FIH-A), less net saving out of wages (SW = W
n – CW).  
Note that in the Post Keynesian literature, it is often assumed that, as a rule of thumb, the 
savings of ordinary, lower class, wage earners are negligible (apart from ‘forced savings’ 
through collective pension plans, etc.), while savings out of profits may be considerable. The 
group of, upper class, ‘profit recipients’ is composed not only of individual entrepreneurs and 
rentiers (shareholders and creditors) but also of higher business executives, whose salaries 
‘are rather akin to profits’ (Kalecki, 1971: 76) (see Lavoie, 1992: 92). 
Equation (3) contains a further macroeconomic restriction, which follows from the defini-
tion of savings out of capital income as the difference between profits and consumption out of 
capital income (SΠ = Π
n – CΠ): 8 
(4)   
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This means that the financial balances (FB) of the private, public and foreign sectors nec-
essarily sum to zero. When, for example, the private sector runs a deficit as a result of, say, 
very low personal savings rates, while the government balance is also negative, this will only 
be possible if the foreign sector (private or public) provides savings of the combined size of 
these two deficits to the domestic sectors of the economy. It is important to bear this funda-
mental macroeconomic restriction in mind, as it determines the boundaries within which fi-
nancialisation can affect the process of profit determination, as defined formally in equation 
(3) and to be discussed in more detail below.  
Linked to our exposition of national accounting identities is a demand side-oriented view 
of economic dynamics. In particular, in accordance with (Post) Keynesian theory, expenditure 
decisions are not constrained by the ex ante existence of savings, but savings (including prof-
its) are created ex post via the income-generating process. While the supply of money is seen 
as endogenous, expenditure decisions may, however, be constrained by the availability of 
credit, or ‘initial means of finance’. Aggregate demand is seen to be a decisive driving force 
of macroeconomic dynamics not only in the short run, but also in the longer run, as not only 
the degree of utilisation but also the level of productive capacities are seen to be endogenous 
to demand, with physical investment being the basis for increases in the capital stock and pro-
ductivity growth (for an overview of theories of ‘demand-led growth’, see Setterfield, 2002). 
 
3.2  Social accounting and ‘coupon pool capitalism’  
Froud et al. (2002) extensively discuss existing concepts of financialisation in the political 
economy literature. In particular, they discuss the similarities and differences between the 
regulationist and their own social accounting approach, on which they build the new concept 
of ‘coupon pool capitalism’.  
The social accounting perspective is critical of exclusively firm-centred analyses (see 
Froud et al., 2000, 2002; Erturk et al., 2004, 2007) and also ‘identif(ies) the household as a 
key institution in a financialised economy’ (Froud et al., 2002: 125). However, while the insti-
tutional analyses of corporate governance structures and household behaviour by this group of 
authors (referred to as Erturk et al. from now on) are enlightening, they seem to lack a coher-
ent macroeconomic framework, as proposed in the previous subsection. In particular, at the 
conceptual level it seems that not much emphasis is put on distinguishing between gross and 
net income flows between the different sectors of the economy. Partly as a result of this, Er-9 
turk et al.’s empirical account of ‘macro trajectories’ in financialised economies (US and UK) 
also diverges somewhat from our own view. In what follows, we focus our empirical remarks 
on the US economy. 
Erturk et al. analyse financialisation along the concept of ‘coupon pool capitalism’:  
In a productionist type of capitalism, the capital market is an unproblematic interme-
diary … Coupon pool is a new generic type where the pool of new and issued cou-
pons becomes a regulator of firm and household behaviour and a regulator of macro 
economic trajectory. .... The ‘coupon pool’ is not the secondary market in issued or-
dinary shares or the secondary and primary markets together because it includes all 
coupon investment opportunities, including bonds, venture capital and securitised pa-
per. (Froud et al., 2002: 128) 
The authors remind us that shareholder value orientation, which is at the heart of ‘coupon 
pool capitalism’, promised to increase firms’ profitability. However, they argue that there is 
now disappointment about the effects of this corporate governance concept on real profitabil-
ity:  
Even with a decade long economic upswing, many blue chip corporations in the 
1990s struggled to generate value through earnings by delivering returns greater than 
their cost of capital (Froud et al., 2000). …. After all, from an earnings point of view, 
shareholder value was an injunction to earn higher returns for shareholders which 
were practically interdicted by product market constraints and/or organisational poli-
tics. (Erturk et al., 2004: 689)  
If shareholder value nevertheless was and continues to be created for the wealthy fraction 
of the population, the argument goes on, this is mainly due to the rise in share prices caused 
by personal savings flowing into the ‘coupon pool’: ‘(t)he structural explanation of the bull 
market is simply that, with financialisation, stock prices are driven by the pressure of middle 
class savings bidding for a limited supply of securities.’ (Froud et al., 2002: 147) Because, it 
is argued, the stock market boom is not backed by equivalent economic value, ‘(s)uch house-
hold behaviour both delivers and frustrates security because it creates a stock market that op-
erates like a giant Ponzi scheme.’ (Froud et al., 2002: 148) 
In view of the empirical studies of profit generation in the US quoted in section 2, it is 
striking that Erturk et al. qualify firms’ performance as mediocre in terms of profitability, 
which is all the more surprising as they equally deplore a ‘downspiral produced by a deterio-
ration in wages and conditions for large groups in the population (that) is unlikely to be coun-
tervailed by wealth effects’ (Froud et al., 2002: 133). After all, a long ‘economic upswing’ 
also implies a positive development in terms of aggregate real income.  
More fundamentally, considering equations 3 and 4 from the previous subsection, an em-
pirical account of ‘macro trajectories’ should in our view be based on an analysis in terms of 10 
net income flows between the different sectors of the economy. In one of their contributions, 
Erturk et al. (2005: 12) recognise themselves that ‘it is misleading to concentrate exclusively 
on the asset side of the household balance sheets because assets need to be considered in the 
context of liabilities.’ Yet, they somewhat half-heartedly conclude that ‘we cannot cover li-
abilities comprehensively but do need to make some basic points so that our story is not bi-
ased by its concentration on assets’. To give a concrete example of the problems involved 
with the concentration on assets, Froud et al. (2002: 141) report the following savings rates 
(‘savings and investment as per cent of disposable income’) for the different income quintiles 
of the private household sector in the US for the year 1996/7: 2.3, 4.7, 8.0, 14.7, 35.7. They 
conclude that ‘only the relatively affluent households can afford to forego current consump-
tion, defer wages and put ten per cent of their income into shares and other coupons through 
pensions, insurance and savings plans’ (Froud et al., 2002: 142). However, while it is undeni-
able that high income households have bought large amounts of financial assets during the 
past decades, they have also increasingly, via the ‘coupon pool’, sold financial assets to the 
business sector and received loans from financial institutions. Noting that, according to na-
tional accounts data (NIPA, table 2.1), the aggregate personal net savings rate in the US was 
3.7 per cent in 1997 and -1.1 per cent in 2006, we can conclude that the net flow of domestic 
personal savings into the ‘coupon pool’ has been much smaller than suggested by Erturk et al.  
More generally, the following clarifications of or additions to the different empirical con-
clusions drawn by Erturk et al. regarding financialisation in the US (since the early 1980s) 
seem warranted from our point of view and will be discussed in greater depth in section 4: 
-  Firms’ performance, measured in rates of profit, has been relatively good in the aggregate, 
not bad. 
-  Private net savings flowing into the ‘coupon pool’ have not been the only (nor even the 
most systematic) source of shareholder value creation. Rather, the business sector has also 
increased dividend payouts and bought back shares. Private purchases of financial assets 
have increasingly been debt-financed. 
-  Dividend payments, share buybacks and rising stock prices benefited primarily upper 
class households (managers and rentiers). Therefore, it is true that there has been no ‘de-
mocratisation of finance’ (Erturk et al., 2007). But the net personal savings rate (particu-
larly of rich households) has heavily declined, partly as a result of increasing financial 
wealth, and private consumption has stimulated growth and profits despite sluggish physi-
cal investment activity.  
-  Financialisation in the US seems indeed likely to produce ‘disappointment’ and ‘frustra-
tion’, as argued by Erturk et al. But the main reason is not so much that domestic personal 11 
net savings flowing into financial markets have led to overvalued asset prices, but rather 
that both households’ and firms’ indebtedness has increased as a result of credit-financed 
consumption and financial speculation as well as share buybacks. Additionally, systematic 
deficits of both the private and public sectors in the US imply, by equation 4, that enor-
mous amounts of capital had to be imported from abroad into the US ‘coupon pool’. This 
may become a threat to the stability of the international financial system. 
 
3.3  Regulationism and ‘finance-led growth regime’ and alternative macroeconomic 
models of financialisation 
Froud et al. (2002: 135) characterise their story line as ‘the opposite of regulationism’. In ef-
fect, they may have a point by saying that the regulationist approach to financialisation tends 
to downgrade the issue of macroeconomic instability arising from ‘contradictions and … in-
coherence at the level of firms and households’: ‘the confusing succession of putative growth 
regimes and insistent preoccupation with the restoration of coherence have now become con-
straints on our understanding’ (Froud et al. 2002: 135). Nevertheless, Boyer’s (2000) concept 
of a ‘finance-led’, or ‘wealth-based accumulation regime’ (see also Aglietta, 2000) has, in our 
view, been a seminal starting point for the systematic analysis of the interaction between, on 
the one hand, firm behaviour increasingly shaped by the profitability norms set by financial 
markets and, on the other hand, household consumption behaviour increasingly affected by 
changes in financial wealth. Boyer (2000) shows that, under certain conditions, a higher fi-
nancial norm can have overall expansionary effects on the economy, based in particular on the 
wealth effect on consumption. Yet, Boyer’s (2000) model is incomplete in some respects, 
such as the absence of a public and a foreign sector, the omission of firms’ and households’ 
financial decisions (share issues or buybacks, debt-financing of investment or consumption, 
distribution of dividends, interest payments), and the absence of an asset price determination 
mechanism. As discussed in the next section, these omissions may in part be linked to the 
downgrading of the potential instability of finance-led economies, arising, amongst other 
things, from increases in private indebtedness (relative to income). As recognised by Boyer 
(2000: 140), ‘(t)he viability of any equity-based economy cannot be assessed without dealing 
explicitly with the role of credit’. More fundamentally, Skott and Ryoo (2007: 1, 2) conclude 
that ‘a more careful modeling of the stock-flow relations … would have been desirable’ in 
Boyer’s (2000) and other regulationist models.  
Potentially negative effects of financialisation for investment and growth have been dis-
cussed by Stockhammer (2004, 2005-6). However, as Boyer’s (2000) model, these macroeco-
nomic models are also set in the context of a closed economy and do not contain a theory of 12 
firms’ financial policies and financial asset price determination. In Stockhammer (2007), a 
broader, political economy perspective is adopted, and the implications of a ‘finance-
dominated accumulation regime’ for each of the different components of aggregate demand 
are discussed. Yet, the purpose of that contribution is not to focus explicitly on the process of 
profit determination, based on macroeconomic circuit relations, nor on a systematic discus-
sion of the interaction of real and financial stocks and flows. 
The formal integration of stock and flow variables in the context of financialisation is the 
object of the theoretical models by Skott and Ryoo (2007) and van Treeck (2007).
6 While 
these are in many aspects similar to our informal approach developed here, they are also set in 
the framework of a closed economy and they are not designed to describe the empirical cases 
of particular economies over certain periods of time. 
Macroeconomic circuit relations are explicitly addressed in the enlightening contributions 
by Van de Velde (2005) and Cordonnier (2006), who argue that as part of financialisation 
fixed capital investment is increasingly substituted for by capitalist consumption as a source 
of macroeconomic profits.
7 The present analysis is largely inspired by the insights of these 
contributions. Cordonnier (2006) proposes an alternative to the regulationist notion of a ‘fi-
nance-led growth regime’,
8 and argues that the phenomenon ‘profits without investment’, 
which he analyses rudimentarily for the US and for France, may best be understood in terms 
of a ‘consumption-based capitalism’ (capitalisme consommatoire). 
 
4.  Financialisation in the USA and in Germany – a macroeconomic analysis 
4.1   Defining the concepts: the implications of financialisation for the business and per-
sonal sectors 
Before discussing the political economy of financialisation in the US and Germany, we need 
to complement the macroeconomic framework set out in section 3.1 with a number of behav-
ioural assumptions regarding in particular the implications of financialisation for firms and 
private households. 
To begin with, in accordance with the literatures sketched above, we assume that an indi-
vidual firm faces a ‘growth-profit trade-off’ over a wide range of its investment possibilities 
(see also Lavoie, 1992; Stockhammer, 2005-6) and that shareholders have a larger preference 
for profitability than managements.  
                                                 
6 For a systematic presentation of stock-flow consistent modelling, see Godley and Lavoie (2007). 
7 Van Treeck (2008) and Hein and van Treeck (2007) have also formally analysed this mechanism in the frame-
work of Post Keynesian models of growth and distribution. 
8 For other critical discussions of Aglietta’s and Boyer’s interpretations of financialisation, see, e.g., Plihon 
(2002), Colletis (2004), Hoang-Ngoc and Tinel (2003). 13 
In the ‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE) literature various proposals have been made 
to alleviate the alleged problem of ‘overinvestment’, which is ascribed to undisciplined man-
agements pursuing their personal objectives (‘empire building’) at the expense of shareholders 
and, due to inefficiencies of production, of society as a whole (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). In particular, by imposing a high distribution rate of profits and high leverage on firms, 
their ‘free cash flow’ and capacity to invest will be reduced. At the institutional level, man-
agements should be disciplined by a liberalised capital market, in which the threat of hostile 
takeovers is permanent (Manne, 1965), which penalises bad but rewards good management 
practices, and channels savings into the most profitable investment opportunities (Fama, 
1980).  
One problem with this view, however, is that managements whose remuneration is closely 
pegged to financial results and who are disciplined by the permanent threat of hostile take-
overs may be subject to the problem of ‘short-term performance obsession’ (Rappaport, 
2006). For instance, a recent, comprehensive survey of management practices in the US 
documents ‘unambiguous managerial intent to burn economic value’ and finds that a majority 
of managers would ‘give up positive NPV [net present value] projects, to meet short-term 
earnings benchmarks’ (Graham et al., 2005: 66; for similar conclusions, see, e.g., Porter, 
1992, Cheng et al., 2005). One explanation for this, now endorsed also by early proponents of 
shareholder value orientation, is that shareholders tend to focus on short-term financial returns 
(in particular, ‘earnings per shares’, EPS) in their decisions to buy or sell particular stocks, 
while the costs of acquiring sufficient information about the ‘actual’ long-term potential of a 
firm are often prohibitive (Jensen, 2005; Rappaport, 2006). The destruction of long-term eco-
nomic value can therefore partly be explained by managers’ fear of ‘severe stock market reac-
tions to small EPS misses’ (Graham et al., 2005: 5). As a further result of information asym-
metries between managers and shareholders, firms may have strong incentives to buy back 
their own equities in order to spur earnings per share and satisfy shareholders. However, share 
buybacks (as well as dividend payments), while increasing the return on equity, at least in the 
short run, reduce the means of finance available to firms for (potentially very profitable) in-
vestment spending (table 1). The strong positive correlation between internal means of fi-
nance and firms’ investment expenditures is a long-established conclusion in macroeconomic 
theory (e.g. Kalecki, 1937; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Hubbard, 
1998; Akerlof, 2007).  
It seems that in the varieties of capitalism literature such potentially negative effects of 
‘fluid’ financial markets tend to be somewhat downgraded. 
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Table 1: The distribution of profits and the financing of investment 
From the net operating surplus to in-
ternal means of finance 
The financing of capital investment 
Net operating surplus  Internal means of finance 
       – Net interest payments  – Net financial investment 
= Corporate profits before tax         = Net increase in credit 
       – Corporate taxes         + Net issuance of equities  
       – Net dividend payments         + Net issuance of bonds 
= Corporate savings         + Net increase in other liabilities 
       + Capital consumption allowances  – Gross capital investment 
= Internal means of finance  = 0 
Source: Author’s representation on the basis of Flow of Funds Accounts. 
 
As for private households, financialisation implies that financial wealth as well as the re-
ceipts from capital income (and management salaries) increase relative to (ordinary) wages. 
Many authors have pointed at the possibility of a ‘wealth effect’, implying that rising wealth 
can be expected to be linked to higher consumer spending, ceteris paribus, and hence to ex-
pansionary effects for aggregate demand and profits. An important macroeconomic implica-
tion of the wealth effect, which is sometimes neglected (e.g. in some regulationist models), is 
that rising wealth is typically also linked to rising personal debt. Clearly, financial wealth is 
by its very nature ‘virtual’ and capital gains cannot be realised on a collective scale, as mas-
sive sales of financial assets would trigger a decline in their price and hence destroy the vir-
tual wealth (Bhaduri et al., 2006). Yet, financial deregulation has increased individuals’ op-
portunities to use their wealth as collateral to borrow from financial institutions such as banks. 
Of course, this then has longer-term implications for personal debt servicing obligations and, 
in general, financial fragility in the economy (Parenteau, 2006; Godley et al., 2007).  
 
4.2  USA: an ideal type of financialisation in an exceptional macroeconomic environ-
ment  
Financialisation in the US is typically seen to have its starting point in the early 1980s (e.g. 
Krippner, 2005). The early 1980s also mark the beginning of a remarkable ‘decoupling’ of 
aggregate profit income and investment spending (figure 1).
9 Of course, this phenomenon 
may also be linked to factors other than financialisation (e.g. technological change or global-
isation), but financialisation seems to have played a major role in it. 
                                                 
9 Much of the empirical material presented in this and the next subsection is based on van Treeck et al. (2007). 15 

















Net operating surplus, private enterprises
Net non-residential private investment
S & P 500 (right scale)
 
 
Source: NIPA (Bureau of Economic Analysis), table 1.10; Fixed Assets Tables (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis), table 5.9; author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 2 and table 2 show important changes in the financial policies of US non-financial 
corporations since the early 1980s. While in the 1970s around 70 per cent of after-tax profits 
were retained by firms, we observe a falling trend in the retention rate since the early 1980s. 
In some years, 100 per cent or more of after-tax profits were distributed as dividends. Simi-
larly, while the contribution of equity issues to the financing of investment has been small 
(but positive) before the 1980s, since then the non-financial corporate sector has, in the ag-
gregate, massively bought back its own shares. This is apparent from the calculations summa-
rised in table 2, which also confirm and update the widely noticed results by Corbett and Jen-
kinson (1997). These showed that firms finance the overwhelming part of their investments 
by internal means of finance, also and particularly in countries with so-called ‘market-based’ 
financial systems (for similar conclusions, see Mayer, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Cor-
bett et al., 2004).  
The extent to which firms’ ‘short-termism’ and liquidity constraints limit investment 
spending is, of course, likely to vary over time. For example, during the ‘New Economy’ 
boom in the late 1990s, euphoric expectations about future profit opportunities in an allegedly 
completely new technological era, together with rising share prices, apparently contributed to 
a remarkable hike in business investment. Yet, this relatively short and very exceptional pe-




Figure 2:  Accumulation rate and rate of retained profits, private non-financial corporations, 
















Rate of retained profits
Accumulation rate (right scale)
 
 
Note: Rate of retained profits = undistributed profits/profits after tax, net of interest payments; accumulation 
rate = Growth rate of net non-residential capital stock (quantity index). 
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts (Federal Reserve), table F. 102; Fixed Assets Tables, table 
4.2; author’s calculations. 
 
 
Table 2: Proportion of different means of finance in the financing of gross capital investment, 




















Internal  1.06 0.90 0.82 0.93 0.90 1.01 1.01 0.93 1.02 
Equities  0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.04  -0.26  -0.03  -0.17  -0.26 
Bonds  0.13 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.24 0.20 
Credit  0.05 0.14 0.21 -0.03 0.07 0.13 -0.06 0.07 0.06 
  from banks  0.10  0.18  0.23  0.05  0.14  0.19  -0.06  0.10  0.04 
  trade credit  -0.05  -0.04  -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.01 
Other  -0.02 -0.08 -0.18 0.13  0.05  0.17 -0.05 -0.15 -0.07 
Stat. Dis-
crepancy  -0.23 -0.14 -0.09 -0.21 -0.10 -0.29 0.01  0.07  0.07 
 
Note: Calculations based on ‘net-flow methodology’ (see table 1 and, for further details, Corbett and Jenkinson, 
1997). Increase in liabilities denoted by ‘+’ sign, increase in assets by ‘–‘ sign. Internal funds = retained earn-
ings + capital consumption allowance + foreign earnings retained abroad + inventory valuation adjustment 
(IVA) + net capital transfers; equities = net new equity issues – money market fund shares – security RPs – 
mutual fund shares; bonds = municipal securities + corporate bonds – treasury securities – agency- and GSE-
backed securities – municipal securities; credit from banks = bank loans n.e.c. + other loans and advances + 
mortgages – foreign deposits – checkable deposits and currency – time and savings deposits – mortgages; trade 
credit = trade payables – consumer credit – trade receivables; other = miscellaneous liabilities  – miscellaneous 
assets  + commercial paper – commercial paper.   
Source: Flow of Funds, table F. 102; author’s calculations. 
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The observations made above confirm our theoretical considerations from the previous 
subsection and they also complement the story of ‘coupon pool capitalism’, according to 
which the rise in share prices over the past decades is mainly explained by ‘middle- and up-
per-class households’ savings flowing into the “coupon pool”’ (Froud et al., 2002: 148). In 
our view, an at least equally important explanation is that firms actively have reduced the 
supply of equities, whereas households, according to our rough calculations (figure 3), have 
repeatedly been a net seller of corporate equities since the 1980s. Recently, the personal net 
savings rate even turned negative (figure 4), although households were still a net buyer of 
financial assets at large (according to the Flow of Funds definition), while they accumulated 
debt (see Parenteau, 2006).
10
 
Figure 3: Net acquisition of direct and indirect corporate equity by private households as a 













1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-06
Net acquisition of direct corporate equity Net acquisition through mutual fund shares
Net acquisition through life insurance reserves Net acquisition through pension fund reserves  
 
Note/Source: Net acquisition of direct corporate equity taken directly from Flow of Funds, table F. 100. Net 
acquisition of mutual fund shares, life insurance reserves and pension fund shares taken from table F. 100 and 
weighted with share of corporate equities in total assets of mutual funds, life insurances and pension funds, 
given in tables L. 117, L. 118, L. 122, respectively. Holdings of mutual fund shares by life insurances and pen-
sion funds weighted with share of corporate equities in total assets of mutual fund shares. 
 
Considering equation 3 from section 3.1 again, it seems that the increase in firms’ rate of 
distributed profits together with the decline in households’ savings rate have allowed for the 
relatively robust development of both business profits and output despite relatively weak in-
vestment activity. Interestingly, some authors have found that during the 1990s especially the 
richest income quintile has reduced its savings rate significantly (table 3; see also IMF, 2002; 
Duménil and Lévy, 2003). This income group held approximately 80 or 90 per cent of house-
                                                 
10 The savings rate reported in national accounts is subject to some measurement problems (e.g. Harvey, 2006).  18 
holds’ equity ownership in the late 1990s (according to the Survey of Consumer Finances), 
and can be seen as corresponding roughly to the group of ‘profit recipients’ within the per-
sonal sector. 
 
Figure 4: Personal wealth and debt relative to disposable income and net personal savings 


















Housing market wealth/disposable income
Outstanding debt/disposable income
Savings/disposable income (right scale)
 
Source: Flow of Funds, table B.100; NIPA, table 2.1; author’s calculations. 
 
 
Table 3: Net worth-to-income ratio and net savings rate, private households (income quin-
tiles), USA, 1992-2000 
Quintile  Net worth/disposable income  Net savings rate (in per 
cent)* 
 1992  2000  1992  2000 
Total 468.6  612.7  5.9  1.3 
Richest quintile  639.5  869.2  8.5  -2.1 
4
th  quintile  332.2  417.1  4.7  2.6 
3
th quintile  326.7  364.9  2.7  2.9 
2
th quintile  328.2  414.5  4.2  7.4 
Poorest quintile  411.3  512.3  3.8  7.1 
* includes defined benefit pension plans. 
Source: Maki and Palumbo (2001: 25). 
 
The rise in private consumption can partly be explained by the rise in personal wealth, as 
argued e.g. in Boyer (2000). Although Froud et al. (2002: 133) downgrade the importance of 
wealth effects, econometric estimations typically find that a one dollar wealth increase is 
linked to an increase in consumption of 2 to 7 cents (e.g. Boone et al., 1998; Altissimo, 2005). 
At the same time, however, household indebtedness also rapidly increased (figure 4). Of 
course, this can be a source of financial fragility, which is especially true for the more recent 19 
hike in personal debt that can in large part be attributed to increased borrowing and consump-
tion opportunities also of low-income households who benefited from the latest housing mar-
ket boom (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2006). Note, however, that despite the apparent 
significance of the wealth effect in the US, the declining personal savings rate and the rising 
debt-to-income ratio do not seem to be fully explained by mainstream macroeconomic theo-
ries alone (e.g. Guidolin and La Jeunesse, 2007). Rather, one may suspect that the increased 
desire to consume must also be linked to some fundamental changes in social norms, often 
neglected in standard economic models
11 (see, however, Lavoie, 1994, 2004; Akerlof, 2007). 
 
















Source: NIPA, tables 5.1, 1.1.5; author’s calculations. 
 
The US government has contributed to the phenomenon ‘profits without investment’ in a 
number of significant ways. As figure 5 shows, large government deficits have been allowed 
for in the face of declining private investment dynamics throughout the 1980s, but also after 
the end of the ‘New Economy’ boom in the early 2000s. Besides, financial deregulation, start-
ing in the 1970s and culminating in, amongst other things, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act 
of 1933 in 1999, as well as accommodating interest rate policies have supported the expansion 
                                                 
11 A thorough analysis of such changes in social norms is well beyond the scope of this paper. A promising indi-
cation is given by Boltanski and Chiapello (2005: 154) who argue that a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ has emerged 
over the past decades, based on the replacement of the ‘industrial city’ by the ‘projective city’ and linked to new 
patterns of consumption: ‘Connexionist human beings are the owners of themselves ... inasmuch as they are the 
product of a labour of self-fashioning. The advent of the projective city is thus closely bound up with another 
striking feature associated with the current change in conceptions of ownership and, in particular, the ownership 
we have over bodies ... This is the very significant growth in industries whose purpose is the exhibition of a self-
image, from fashion, health, dietics or cosmetics, through the rapidly expanding personal development industry 
which … accompanied the reorganization of firms with the emergence of new professions, like that of a coach. 
…. everyone is responsible for their bodies, their image, their success, their destiny.’ 20 
of credit flowing to the personal sector (Chancellor, 2005; Kuttner, 2007). The ‘government-
sponsored enterprises’ Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have directly contributed to the housing 
market boom of the early 2000s by providing households with important amounts of mort-
gages (up to 70 per cent of all mortgages in some years, according to Bloomberg, 6 Septem-
ber 2007). Additionally, private spending on consumption and housing was supported by 
large multi-year tax cuts and interest rate cuts immediately after the burst of the ‘New Econ-
omy’-bubble in 2000 (Parenteau, 2006). 
 
Table 4: Trade balances of selected countries, in billions of US Dollars, 1996-2006 
  1996 2000 2006 
USA  -124.8 -415.2 -877.6 
UK  -10.5 -37.4 -55.6 
Spain -1.4  -23.0  -107.0 
Germany -13.8  -33.9  116.8 
Japan 65.1  118.7  164.9 
China (without Hong Kong)  7.2  20.5  211.3 
‘Dynamic Asia’*  -8.1  61.2  116.8 
Central and South America  -36.1  -28.3  45.3 
Middle East/Africa  1.3  79.3  280.0 
Central and Eastern Europe  -0.3  42.4  69.6 
*Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 80. 
 
The deterioration of the private financial balance, which was in the main part due to the 
decline in the personal savings rate (see also Godley et al., 2007), together with the almost 
permanent government deficit imply that the US external balance has been massively negative 
in recent times (see equation 4 from section 3.1 and figure 5). Hence, if the image of ‘coupon 
pool capitalism’ is to be maintained as a description of the US economy, an important part of 
this story would have to be the substantial net inflow of foreign savings. From an international 
political economy perspective, this dimension of the financialisation of the US economy can-
not be highlighted enough. As table 4 shows, especially emerging economies in Asia and 
Latin America turned from net importers of capital in the mid-1990s to net exporters in the 
mid-2000s. When these economies were hit by the consecutive financial and currency crises 
in the 1990s, the concomitant capital outflows were in large part directed to the US, where 
they contributed to the ‘New Economy’ boom by supporting the rise in stock prices and offer-
ing attractive borrowing opportunities to the US personal and business sectors. The continu-
ing efforts of these emerging economies to accumulate foreign currency reserves (‘war 
chests’) can partly be understood as a pre-emptive measure against potential future currency 
crises (e.g. Bernanke, 2005). Other important exporters of capital were developed economies 21 
with weak internal growth dynamics, such as Germany, where no significant wealth effect 
operates and personal savings rates are high (see next subsection). 
We agree with Erturk et al. that financialisation in the US is likely to create (even more) 
‘disappointment’ and ‘frustration’ in the future. However, in our view the main reason is that 
financialisation, although compatible so far with relatively robust economic growth, has con-
tributed to creating massive macroeconomic imbalances, especially a one-sided dependence 
on consumption. Although US growth may have been ‘finance-led’ in some sense in the past, 
it is doubtful whether a coherent novel ‘regulation mode’ is now in place and whether a con-
siderable wealth effect will still operate in the future, given the increased indebtedness of 
many private households. What is more, an asset price deflation may undermine the credit-
worthiness or even the solvency of many private households, as the recent ‘subprime’ mort-
gage crisis reveals. Similarly, firms’ indebtedness has also increased substantially over the 
past decades, partly as a result of debt-financed share buybacks. Another source of instability 
is the external deficit of the US. As capital imports have primarily been used for consumption 
purposes, serious doubts about the ability of the US to service foreign debt in the future may 
arise and threaten the stability of the international financial system. Even a substantial depre-
ciation of the US dollar may not be sufficient for US firms to recover the market share losses 
that have accompanied the de-industrialisation of the business sector as a result of weak 
manufacturing investment apparently linked to financialisation (e.g. Hersh, 2003; Weller, 
2003). Of course, all these elements of fragility have not been prevented by the institutional 
complementarity of ‘fluid’ financial and labour markets in the US ‘liberal market economy’. 
Finally, note that the aforementioned developments are also linked to the observation by 
Krippner (2005) and others of a rising proportion of profits accruing through financial activi-
ties. In particular, financial institutions have benefited from the fees involved with the manag-
ing of personal wealth and debt (e.g. Chancellor, 2005). Yet, as argued above, the underlying 
reason for the positive development of aggregate profits despite sluggish investment activity 
is to be found in real income flows, especially the changed patterns of private consumption.  
 
4.3  Germany: financialisation in an adverse macroeconomic environment 
Germany has traditionally been considered as a typical example of a ‘coordinated market 
economy’ in terms of the varieties of capitalism approach. However, while Germany’s labour 
market was indeed seen, in the past, as highly regulated and the financial system characterised 
as ‘bank-based’, financialisation has brought about substantial changes also in this country, at 
least since the mid- or late 1990s.  22 
As a reflection of this, equity repurchases have become increasingly important since the 
late 1990s. More generally, as shown in table 5, the proportion of internally financed invest-
ment has increased in the recent past. Referring to the euro area, the European Central Bank 
notes that ‘firms that have undertaken share buybacks over the past few years have, on aver-
age, invested less than firms not undertaking any share buybacks’ (ECB, 2007: 103), although 
it argues that the direction of causality is unclear. In this context, it is important to note that 
share buybacks had been completely banned in Germany prior to 1998 (as a consequence of 
the financial crisis of 1931). Also, the 2002 taxation reform abolished the previously very 
important tax on capital gains from equity sales for corporations so that the risk of hostile 
takeovers has considerably increased. Partly as a result of these two important reforms, share-
holder value orientation and high stock prices have become a major objective of managements 
(ECB, 2007: 110), potentially at the expense of physical investment. One could also mention 
a range of further reforms introducing, e.g., the legalisation of hedge funds (2003), preferen-
tial tax treatment for investment funds, hedge funds, private equity funds and REITs (2007–
8), reducing the corporate tax rate by more than half (2002, 2007), or abolishing the tax on 
stock exchange dealings (1991) (for an overview, see Hein and van Treeck, 2008). In sum, it 
seems well possible that financialisation, amongst important other factors, in particular a re-
strictive macroeconomic policy mix (Hein and Truger, 2005), has contributed to the break-
down of the investment-profit nexus in Germany since the mid-1990s, apparent in figure 6. 
 
Table 5: Proportion of different means of finance in the financing of gross capital investment, 




















Internal  0.74 0.79 0.68 0.83 0.79 0.88 0.72 0.81 0.88 
Equities  0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03  -0.10 
Bonds  0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.03  -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.09 0.13 
Credit  0.16 0.13 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.26 -0.01 
Capital trans-
fers  0.04 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.07 
Other  0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.10  -0.02  -0.14 0.05 
Stat. Discrep-
ancy  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 
* until 1991 all non-financial businesses. 
Note: Calculations based on ‘net-flow methodology’ (see table 2). Internal funds = retained earnings + depre-
ciation + pension funds; equities = Shares – Shares; bonds = bonds – bonds (incl. money market paper); credit 
= long- and short-term bank credit + insurance loans – cash and deposits – credit; capital transfers = different 
forms of subsidies; other = other equities – other equities – insurance shares – financial derivatives – investment 
certificates + other liabilities – other assets.   
Source: Flow of Funds (Deutsche Bundesbank); author’s calculations. 
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Source: AMECO; Ecowin; author’s calculations. 
 
 
Figure 7: Personal wealth and debt relative to disposable income and net personal savings 
























Note: Household sector includes personal firms since 1991.  
Source: Flow of Funds; National Accounts (Statistisches Bundesamt); author’s calculations. 
 
The deregulation of the financial system has been accompanied by the deregulation of the 
labour market, in particular since the early 2000s. The replacement rate and duration of un-
employment benefits have been significantly reduced, the degree of wage bargaining coordi-
nation has heavily declined together with trade union power, and temporary employment con-
tracts as well as wage dispersion are heavily on the rise (e.g. Hein and Truger, 2005; Bell-
mann and Kuehl, 2007; Schettkat, 2006; Dustmann et al., 2007). As an exception to this proc-24 
ess of deregulation, the traditional institution of co-determination has been maintained in 
Germany. This leads Höpner (2005: 350) to conclude: ‘Elective affinities between institutions 
actually exist. But the interplay of shareholder orientation and co-determination in Germany 
shows that the range of possible complementarities may be larger than the number of already 
existing configurations.’ We agree that particular national traditions may be very persistent. 
But, for the purposes of the present analysis and for the reasons mentioned above, it seems 
fair to conclude that Germany has indeed been undergoing a process of convergence towards 
a ‘liberal market economy’, in which both financial and labour markets are increasingly 
‘fluid’. 
However, this apparent process of convergence to the US (or Anglo-Saxon) model takes 
place in a very different macroeconomic environment. As for households’ consumption be-
haviour, we observe that the personal net savings rate is substantially higher in Germany than 
in the US (figure 7). After fluctuating around 12 to 14 per cent from the 1960s to the early 
1990s, the personal savings rate decreased somewhat during the (modest) boom of the late 
1990s, only to start increasing again in the early 2000s. Beyond the general influence of con-
sumption norms, this seems in part due to the widespread feeling of insecurity caused in par-
ticular by the deregulation of the labour market and the partial privatisation of the pension 
system (Klär and Slacalek, 2006). Also, income inequality is massively on the rise (e.g. Bach 
and Steiner, 2007) and higher income groups have very high savings rates (figure 8). There-
fore, Erturk et al.’s image of ever-increasing middle- and upper-class savings flowing into the 
‘coupon pool’ appears appropriate for Germany. As can be seen from figure 7, financial 
wealth has risen substantially, while personal debt has stagnated, despite financial deregula-
tion. Econometric studies confirm that the propensity to consume out of wealth has so far 
been very weak (e.g. Boone et al., 1998; Altissimo et al., 2005).  
As aggregate demand, and hence profits, were only weakly supported by domestic private 
consumption, the ‘decoupling’ of investment and profits has taken place in a low growth envi-
ronment in Germany and is to a large part accounted for by the external surplus (table 4, fig-
ure 9). While Germany’s export performance can partly be attributed to the, by international 
comparison, exceptional wage restraint over the past years, the financial side of the foreign 
account surplus is that personal savings (by upper-class households) were too large to be ab-
sorbed by the business and public sectors. As investment spending was weak, and the public 
sector unwilling or, constrained by the Maastricht regime, unable to play a similarly active 
role in sustaining aggregate demand as the US government, excess private savings were ex-
ported to the rest of the world (Hein and Truger, 2007). 
 25 
Figure 8: Net savings rate, private households (income fractiles), Germany, 1993-2003 
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Share in total number of households Share in total disposable income Savings rate  
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances (EVS, Statistisches Bundesamt); author’s calculations. 
 
Erturk et al. concluded that financialisation was (going to be) producing disappointment 
and frustration in the US and UK. This may be true also for Germany, albeit for somewhat 
different reasons. Income inequality has significantly increased, economic growth has been 
sluggish and unemployment high in recent times, given weak domestic demand. At the same 
time, due to the large relative contribution of net exports to economic growth, an economic 
downturn abroad has immediate repercussions on the German economy via the export chan-
nel. Simultaneously, as German financial institutions, constrained domestically by the weak 
credit demand of both the business and the personal sector, are strongly oriented towards fi-26 
nancial investments abroad, they are particularly subject to the risk of contagion in case of a 
financial crisis abroad. As an example, German banks were particularly hit by the recent US 
subprime mortgage crisis (e.g. SVR, 2007, ch. 3). 
 
















Source: National Accounts; author’s calculations. 
 
Froud et al. (2000: 105) argued that  
(t)he financialization of other national economies (outside the UK and US) is possible 
but only when a series of national conditions are met and institutional resistances are 
overcome. These preconditions include: first, the existence of value-oriented inves-
tors (of domestic and/or foreign origin) making the appropriate calculations; second, a 
throw weight for value investment so that it can influence market sentiment and cor-
porate conduct through mechanisms such as hostile takeover; third, management pre-
rogatives which allow labour shedding for rapid cost reduction. 
It is our contention that all of these conditions are nowadays met in Germany (and many 
other countries), but for the reasons stated above, financialisation leads to very different re-
sults than in the US. The same conclusion applies to the effects of institutional complementar-
ity in the financial and labour markets, which seem to depend crucially on whether particular 
institutions are complementary also to social norms and macroeconomic conditions. As rec-
ognised by Hall and Gingerich (2004: 8),  
the complementarities may still be operative but their impact on cross-national differ-
ences in growth overwhelmed by recent developments for which we do not control in 
these equations. The latter could include cross-national differences in economic pol-
icy, confidence effects arising from asset booms, or technology races that privilege 
first movers. We cannot currently discriminate between these explanations. 27 
5.  Final remarks: towards an interdisciplinary, structuralist analysis of financialisation 
In this paper, we have tried to illustrate how different strands in the political economy litera-
ture on financialisation may be enriched by an explicitly macroeconomic perspective.  
To begin with, such a perspective may help prevent potentially erroneous conclusions 
about the causalities involved with e.g. the generation of profits, or the increasing importance 
of financial operations.  
Also, the explicit focus on net income flows and holdings of assets and liabilities may 
help to refine empirical analyses based on the concept of ‘coupon pool capitalism’, developed 
by British social accountants, in that it makes explicit how financial markets connect (or 
shape) the behaviour of different sectors in the economy that is relevant for macroeconomic 
outcomes.  
Similarly, the analysis of financial fragility arising from potentially unsustainable changes 
in the relations between real and financial flows and stocks allows putting in perspective the 
regulationist concept of a stable and coherent ‘wealth-based accumulation regime’. 
The varieties of capitalism approach, with its sophisticated tools regarding the analysis of 
institutions, may also benefit from a more explicitly macroeconomic focus. In particular, 
complementarity in our view concerns not only financial and labour market institutions, but, 
more generally, social norms and cultural habits (e.g. regarding the risk-taking involved with 
wealth-based and credit-financed personal consumption), political power relations (e.g. in-
come distribution or the power to sustain current account deficits over extended periods of 
time), and macroeconomic policy (e.g. the willingness of the government to use fiscal and 
monetary policies to boost and sustain aggregate demand, asset prices, etc.). As an illustra-
tion, we have argued that although Germany seems to be currently in the process of transfor-
mation from a ‘coordinated’ to a ‘liberal market economy’ in terms only of financial and la-
bour market regulation, the macroeconomic effects of financialisation are and will arguably 
continue to be very different from its effects in the US.  
We hope that the present analysis, although it is far from comprehensive and its conclu-
sions far from definite, contributes to an interdisciplinary research programme in which the 
political economy, cultural, social and institutional underpinnings of different macroeconomic 
outcomes of financialisation are investigated as parts of a coherent structuralist analysis.  
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